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Abstract. In the context of missions accomplished jointly by an artifical
agent and a human agent, we focus on a controller of the authority dy-
namics based on a dependence graph of resources that can be controlled
by both agents. The controller is designed to adapt the behaviours of
the artificial agent or of the human agent in case of an authority con-
flict occurring on these resources. The relative authority of two agents
regarding the control of a resource is defined so as the authority conflict,
which appears relevant to trigger authority reallocation between agents
as shown by a first experiment. Finally a second experiment shows that
beyond the modification of the artificial agent’s behaviour, it is also pos-
sible to adapt the human operator’s behaviour in order to solve such a
conflict.
1 Introduction
We consider an heterogeneous agent system in which a robot (UGV3, UAV4) or
a software agent (automatic pilot in a plane) accomplishes a mission interacting
with a human agent (operator, pilot). During the mission, agents are given or
take the authority [1] to use a resource, to perform a task, to satisfy a goal: for
instance, an aircraft automatic pilot in mode Vertical Speed has the authority on
the flight control surfaces in order to reach a given altitude while guaranteeing
some flight performance; if the crew disconnect the automatic pilot, then they
take over the authority on the controls to reach this goal. A change in authority
allocation can be planned in procedures or in the mission plan, or can be unex-
pected: this happens when the human operator takes over a task controlled by
the artificial agent (software or robot) because she detects a failure, or for any
reason of her own; or when the artificial agent takes over a task controlled by
the operator because the operator’s action violates some constraints (going out
of the flight envelop, collision with an obstacle, etc.), or because communication
with the operator is broken; or when no agent has the authority anymore: for
instance, the automatic pilot has disconnected itself and the crew, who is not
flying, is not aware of that.
The challenge created by these unexpected changes in authority allocation is
3 Unmanned Ground Vehicle
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that conflicts are likely to appear within the system, due to the fact that either
the plan for both the human and artificial agents is not followed anymore, or the
operator has a wrong situation awareness [2], or both. This is illustrated by the
following experiment, conducted at Supaero-ISAE, on a target search mission by
a ground robot and a remote human operator. During the mission, the operator
must pilot the robot manually to identify targets, via her interface. Whereas
the operator takes over the robot for identification, the robot starts returning
to base, a procedure triggered by the detection of a failing battery (unexpected
event simulated by a wizard of Oz5 interface). This event is presented on the
operator’s interface via three alarms: the battery icon switches from green to
orange, the piloting mode blinks twice from ”manual” to ”supervised”, and the
display shows ”Return to base” in green. However this unexpected event occurs
at a critical time in the mission when the operator is particularly focused on the
identification task in manual mode; therefore it is expected she will not perceive
this change of states and that both agents (operator and robot) will persevere
in pursuing their own goal (identify the target or return to base, respectively).
Subject Conflict duration (in s.) Understanding Seen alarms
Dasje 6 yes supervised, return to base, battery
Deffra 50 no supervised
Dupni 50 no supervised, return to base
Gatthi 50 no supervised, return to base
Guiju 50 no -
Guiny 50 no battery
Hosal 18 yes return to base, battery
Jacchi 50 no supervised
Nival 10 yes supervised, battery
Peich 29 no return to base
Penju 50 no supervised
Pense 35 yes supervised, battery
Rojan 50 no -
Schpa 50 no -
Table 1. Participants’behaviours during the authority conflict
Table 1 shows the eye-tracker results of 14 subjects6, analyzed with the Eye
tech Lab software. The first column is the participant’s identifier, the second one
the conflict duration, the third one whether the reason of the conflict has been
understood and the fourth one the seen alarms. For instance, participant Dasje
took 6 seconds to detect and understand the conflict, he looked at least once
at the ”supervised” mode, the ”return to base” display and the battery state.
Participant Dupni did not understand the conflict after 50 seconds, although her
gaze went on ”supervised” and on ”return to base”. However she never looked
at the state of the battery. The results of this experiment are consistent with
our hypotheses as the authority conflict led 10 subjects out of 14 to persevere
5 Interface allowing to trigger events without the operator being aware
6 subjects are equipped with a Pertech (25Hz) eye-tracker.
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in their target identification task, which was an error. The analysis of the gaze
behaviour of the 4 successful participants reveals that these operators looked at
least at the couples (”battery state”, ”supervised” mode) or (”battery state”,
”return to base”) or even at the three pieces of information. Finally, it is worth
mentionning that the robot sticked to its plan of returning to base, without
taking into account the conflict with the operator. The work presented here
aims at designing and implementing an authority dynamics controller within the
artificial agent architecture, in order to:
– detect conflicts related to an unexpected authority change;
– identify the consequences of such conflicts on the mission;
– adapt the agents’plans and if necessary, the authority allocation, in order to
”accept” the authority change or on the contrary to ”counter” it; the adap-
tation encompasses the sending of information or guidance to the operator.
We suppose that the artificial agent is equipped with a planning function (or
a set of procedures) and a situation assessment function (or state estimation).
The authority dynamics controller will be based on objective mission elements
(software and physical resources, tasks, goals, constraints) which will be called
resources. On top of each resource we will define the authority of an agent
relatively to another agent. The state of these resources is an abstraction of
the system state provided by the siuation assessment function. The mission
plan (or procedure) is extracted as a resource graph, where conflicts caused by
an unexpected authority change will appear. Conflict solving will consist in
modifying the resource graph via a plan modification or an authority change
between agents on a resource subset.
2 Autonomy and authority
The literature is mainly focused on predefined autonomy levels that are descrip-
tive and not suited to real operations of robots. [3] first proposed a classification
for operational autonomy of a robot system based on a ten-level scale. This
model remains quite abstract as it takes into account neither the environment
complexity nor the mission context. Other scales for autonomy classification
have been proposed, e.g. [4]. Other approaches aim at evaluating the autonomy
of a robot in a given mission context, like MAP [5], ACL [6] or ALFUS [7].
The latter proposes to evaluate autonomy according to three aspects: mission
complexity, environmental difficulty and human interface. However this method-
ology aggregates many heterogeneous metrics and the meaning of the result is
hard to evaluate.
The main principle of these approaches is that machine and human abilities are
complementary and they are likely to provide better performance when joined
efficiently than when used separately [8]. A robot agent is thus capable of evolv-
ing at several predefined autonomy levels and switches levels according to the
context. A level is defined by the complexity of the commands [9] or the ability
to perform tasks without the need of operator’s interventions [10]. The major
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limitations we can see in these approaches is the a priori definition of the levels
and the static distribution of the tasks and interactions between the robot and
the operator at each level.
To add more flexibility, [11] distinguish between adjustable autonomy, where
the operator chooses the operating modes of the robot, and adaptive autonomy,
where the robot itself chooses its operating mode. [12] endow robot agents with
learning capabilities allowing them to better manage the need for human inter-
vention. However this method does not seem to be directly applicable to critical
systems as the behaviour of learning agents facing unexpected situations is hard
to validate. Moreover the operator’s interactions are restricted to the needs of
the robot agents.
On a similar principle, [13] build a model allowing artificial agents and human
operators to transfer decision making to each other and compare their decisions.
Inconsistencies in the team can be detected in order to be solved. While the
idea of inconsistencies seems to be really relevant in the context of a team of
agents, the authors do not say how they should be solved (who should have the
priority if the artificial agent and the human operator disagree?) The approach
of [14] adds more human control on the robot agent. Levels are not defined in
a static way but come from a norm: permissions and restrictions describing the
behaviours of the robot agent are set by the operator through a set of rules with
the risk of conflict between rules. Moreover the autonomy of the robot agent is
completely human-supervised and the robot agent has no possibility to adapt
itself.
In contrast, collaborative control is an approach aiming at creating dialogs be-
tween the operator and the robot [15]: the robot sends requests to the human
operator when problems occur so that they could provide the needed support.
This is again a restriction of all possible interactions: only dialog is used what-
ever the circumstances. In practice almost all interactions are initiated by the
robot and the operator acts almost exclusively as a support. [16] and [17] base
task allocation between the robot and the operator on statistics to determine
which entity will be the most efficient. This does not guarantee a success because
statistics summarize very different situations. However authority sharing at the
task level is an interesting idea as it provides the most adaptive solution to the
mission.
As shown by the literature review it is often interesting to join human and ma-
chine abilities to carry out a mission and adjustable autonomy seems a good
principle. However the fact that the human operator also is fallible is often ne-
glected. Moreover the simultaneous decisions and actions of artificial and human
agents are likely to create misunderstandings and lead to conflicts [18]. Indeed,
to our knowledge, control changes are not studied under the perspective of the
conflicts that they can create between agents. As the experiment presented in
introduction shows, as well as the study of aviation accident reports [18], unex-
pected or misunderstood authority changes can lead to inefficient, dangerous or
catastrophic situations. In order to consider the human agent and the artificial
agent in the same way, we prefer to use the concept of authority and authority
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control instead of autonomy, which concerns the artificial agent exclusively. The
authority dynamics controller that we present aims at detecting and solving au-
thority conflicts, taking into account the following different requirements about
control: the initiative can be given to the artificial agent, to the operator, or
to both agents; the granularity of authority objects must be appropriate, for
detecting and solving conflicts. Moreover there is a need for an objective and
application-independent criterion of authority evolution. Finally, models of the
operator’s tasks and ”state” should be incorporated into the artificial agent’s
knowledge, as well as the operator’s inputs (from ”low level” orders to ”high
level” orders).
3 Resources and authority
3.1 Resources
An authority conflict appears as an inconsistency in an agent’s plan (for instance
a constraint is not respected), or as an interference between several agents’plans
(for instance, the use of the same non-shareable resource at the same time). In
order to possibly reallocate authority between agents, the conflict must be eval-
uated: the involved agents must be identified, as well as the violated constraints
or the part of the plan that is impaired. The authority dynamics controller will
be based on a representation of the agents current plans, i.e. which tasks they
perform, which means they need, which constraints they must respect to satisfy
their goals. Therefore we represent an agent’s plan as a dependency graph.
We suppose that the artificial agent (that will embed the authority dynam-
ics controller) has planning abilities. A dependency graph is obtained from the
abstraction of a plan generated by an automated planner (e.g. an HTN planner
- Hierarchical Task Network - like JSHOP2 [19]). Dependencies are extracted
from the planning operators, as they can be linked to each other by matching
their instanciated preconditions and effects.
Definition: the dependency graph resulting from the abstraction of a plan is
a graph whose nodes are resources and arcs represent the precondition relation-
ship ”A needs B” between resources.
Therefore a resource represent a physical element of the system (sensor, energy,
etc.) or a symbolic element (piece of information, task, goal, constraint, opera-
tor’s input, etc). A leaf-node is a goal. Such a dependency graph will be referred
to as resource graph. This is a dynamic graph that will be updated according to
the updates of the plan during the mission.
In our formal model based on Petri nets, resources are represented using a single
generic net, encompassing a resource states and static properties. As depen-
dency arcs can also have different properties, we represent them using another
generic Petri net that we call interface, see [20].
Example: in order to produce the goal ”Reach WP-Goal”, the planning
operator NavigationRobot is instanciated with the parameter WP-Goal as the
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destination and robot as the performing agent. We thus obtain the resource
graph shown on figure 1, with WP-Goal as the goal, Navigation Robot as the
instanciated task and the energy, position, steering wheel and safety distance as
the preconditions. We notice that if one of the resources vanishes during the
execution due to an unexpected event, the depending resources will be affected
too.
Fig. 1. Resource graph to reach goal WP-Goal
3.2 Authority
Definition: the authority of an agent 푋 on a resource 푅 relatively to another
agent 푌 is defined through the following properties:
– the access right is the capacity of agent to 푋 include a resource 푅 in a
resource graph, that is to control 푅 in order to reach a goal;
– the preemptability right: for a ”non shareable” resource, though 푋 has access
to 푅, it can be controlled by 푌 . The preemptability right gives agent 푋 the
right to use 푅 as soon as needed, taking it from agent 푌 if necessary;
– the control guarantee right: once agent 푋 controls 푅 (i.e. 푋 has accessed
the resource), 푋 may lose it to the benefit of 푌 through preemption. The
control guarantee allows agent 푋 to be certain that agent 푌 will not be able
to take 푅 away from it.
Therefore the authority of an agent on a resource is characterized by:
– a gradation of the agent’s authority: agent 푋’s control on resource 푅 gets
stronger as it is granted with the access right, the preemptability right and
the control guarantee right, in this order.
– authority, as autonomy [21] is a relative concept: for instance, for a given
resource 푅, agent 푋 may have the preemption right over agent 푌 , but not
over agent 푍. Consequently there are as many authority relationships as
there are couples of agents that may control the resource.
– authority is shared between the agents: for a couple of agents < 푋,푌 >
that may control resource 푅, the authority gain of agent 푋 on resource
푅 corresponds to an authority loss for agent 푌 . For instance, if agent 푋
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obtains the control guarantee on 푅, this means agent 푌 loses preemptability.
Consequently if agent 푋 gets exclusivity rights on 푅, agent 푌 will not have
access to 푅 anymore : agent 푋 prevents agent 푌 to access resource 푅, even
if it does not use it.
Fig. 2. Authority relationship between two agents 푋 and 푌 on a given resource 푅:
Petri net AR(X,Y).
The Petri net AR(X,Y) in figure 2 represents the authority relationship be-
tween two agents 푋 et 푌 for a given resource 푅. Each place corresponds to
the state of access, preemptability and control guarantee for both agents 푋 and
푌 regarding resource 푅. The state changes modify the behaviour of 푅, i.e. it
determines whether 푅 can be allocated to 푋 or 푌 , or not.
Agent Authority Access Preemption Guarantee
X No Access No - -
Y Preemptability Yes Anytime Yes
X Access Yes Waiting No
Y Preemptability Yes Anytime Yes
X Preemptability Yes Anytime No
Y Preemptability Yes Anytime No
X Access Yes Waiting Yes
Y Access Yes Waiting Yes
Table 2. Properties of relative authority between agents 푋 and 푌 for resource 푅
In Table 2, each double line gives, for each agent 푋 and 푌 , its authority
on resource 푅 and the status of the three associated properties. There are two
intermediate states for which the authority of the agents is equivalent, (Access
/ Access) and (Preemptability / Preemptability). As far as the first one is
concerned, the agents cannot take the resource from one another, each one must
wait for the other one to relax the resource. This is a cooperation context. As
far as the second one is concerned the agents can take the resource control from
one another indefinitely, which makes the behaviour of the system unefficient or
even dangerous. This is a competition context.
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4 Conflicts on resources
4.1 Definitions
During the mission execution, discrepancies may appear between the plan and
the observed facts. They may come from hazards occurring in the environment,
failures or unplanned actions of the agents. They appear in the resource graph,
as it is an abstraction of the nominal plan: one or several resources within the
graph are put into an inconsistent state. The inconsistency for a resource is
defined as a non-desired marking in the resource Petri net model.
A non-desired marking can appear on any resource of the model. As re-
sources are all represented by the same Petri net, it is only necessary to study
the reachable markings of this net, according to its inital marking (i.e. the re-
source properties). A reachable marking results either from a nominal event
sequence, or from an unexpected event sequence, the latter being undesired.
Definition: a conflict on a resource 푅 is a non-desired reachable marking of
the Petri net representing 푅. There are two types of conflicts:
– There is a ConflictDestruction when 푅 is in state Absent while it is Allocated. It
corresponds to a faulty hardware, a software error or a task failure, depending
on what the resource represents.
– There is a ConflictPreemption when 푅 is a non-shareable resource and has two
simultaneous users. It follows the action of an agent who is requiring 푅,
which is already used by another agent.
Example: the robot performs its navigation task to reach WP-arrival. The
operator unexpectedly decides to take manual control of the robot trajectory
via her joystick for heading control. The human agent’s action modifies the
resource graph, as shown on figure 3. The request is associated with the fact
that the operator wants to perform a manual navigation task, whose arrival
point is only known by the operator. Resource Steering Wheel that was al-
ready allocated to resource Navigation Robot via interface int3, is preemptable
and requested by resource Navigation Operator via another interface: resource
Steering Wheel is allocated via interface int8. Resource Steering Wheel is then
simultaneously allocated to resources Navigation Robot and Navigation Opera-
tor, which is inconsistent as Steering Wheel is a ”non shareable” resource. This
is a ConflictPreemption. The resource graph of figure 3 explicitly represents the
state of knowledge of the robot agent after the human agent’s action.
4.2 Authority conflict solving
Solving without authority change We have seen that there are two types of
conflict: ConflictDestruction and ConflictPreemption, which correspond to undesired
reachable markings within one or several resources in the resource graph. The
role of the authority dynamics controller, which is part of the robot agent, is to
detect conflicts then to restore back the consistency within the resource graph:
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Fig. 3. resource graph after insertion of detected human operator’s action, conflict
– Conflict detection: an undesired marking is detected within 푅 Petri net.
– Request to the planner: triggered by the authority dynamics controller. A
new plan is searched to restore consistency by reallocating resources between
agents, while keeping the existing goals. However some parts of the plan may
be imposed, depending on the agents’actions that cannot be modified: the
search space is constrained by the actions achievable by the agents as well
as the authority relationships between agents on resources. The interaction
with the human operator is one of the actions available to the artificial agent
in order to restore the consistency of the resource(s) involved in the conflict.
– If a solving plan is found, this means that dependency arcs (interfaces) need
to be deleted or created to update the resource graph. The existing authority
relationships remain unchanged.
Example: on the example on figure 3, a preemption conflict has occurred
on resource Steering Wheel. Resources Navigation Robot and Navigation Op-
erator are competing for the control of resource Steering Wheel which is ”non-
shareable”. ASteeringWheel(r,h) represents the authority relationship between the
robot agent 푟 and the human operator ℎ on SteeringWheel (see figure 2). This
authority relationship is such that the robot has Access to Steering Wheel and
the human can Preempt Steering Wheel, so the interface created by the operator
gets the priority over the interface created by the robot. However replanning
must be triggered, as the robot agent’s plan is now unfeasable: a plan satisfying
both goals WP-Operator and WP-Goal is searched, the abstraction of which
contains resource Navigation Operator.
Authority sharing dynamics If no solving plan is found without authority
change, planning requires the modification of some authority relationships in
order to release some constraints and increase the size of its search space: tran-
sitions Ag r gain, Ag r loss, Ag h gain and Ag h loss on relationships AR(r,h) can
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be fired, 푅 being one of the conflicting resource or any other available resource
allowing to create a solving plan. In case no solving plan is found within this
enlarged search space, the planner must generate a downgraded plan, inducing
the loss of one or several goals.
Example: While the human operator is controlling the manual navigation
task (resource Navigation Operator), she violates the safety distance constraint,
destroying resource SafetyDistance. There is a ConflictDestruction within resource
SafetyDistance. A solving plan consists in urgently giving back the navigation
control to the robot agent: transitions Ag r gain then Ag h loss are successively
fired within ASteeringWheel(r,h), in order to give Preemptability to the robot: the
robot agent has gained authority temporarily over the human operator for re-
source SteeringWheel. This makes it possible to allocate resource Steering Wheel
to resource EmergencyNavRobot to produce resource SafetyDistance which had
become a goal.
5 Experiments
The experiment described in the introduction is considered again (same exper-
imental setup, same scenario), using the authority dynamics controller. This
second experiment was conducted with 12 subjects. The goal was to test empir-
ically one of the actions available to the authority dynamics controller to restore
consistency in case of a conflict, using a planned interaction with the opera-
tor. Based on a simplified model of the operator’s situation awareness (her gaze
behaviour), the artificial agent attempts to solve the conflict by modifying the
operator’s behaviour instead of its own. As the human operator is persevering
into her task, the robot agent uses an interaction procedure to change the infor-
mation presented to the operator to get her out of her task. Figure 4 shows the
resource graph corresponding to the robot returning to base while making the
operator stop persevering and understand the robot’s behaviour.
The artificial agent has two distinct simultaneous goals WP-Base and SA Operator,
which explains that the resource graph is not connected. The resource subgraph
for goal WP-Base involves task Navigation Robot controlling SteeringWheel,
which in turn implies that the robot has preempted SteeringWheel from the
operator. The second goal SA Operator means that the artificial agent aims
at getting the human operator out of her perseveration by informing her about
the conflict (ConflictDestruction on resource Energy) and about the plan gener-
ated to solve this conflict; the operator has to recover her situation awareness.
Therefore this resource graph contains an interaction task SendSACounterMea-
sure, which is a cognitive counter-measure [22] based on the conflict information
Info:ConflictOnEnergy and plan information Info:NewPlanGoToWP-Base. The
eye-tracking data showed that these pieces of information had not been seen.
The cognitive counter-measure consists in removing the panoramic vision dis-
play where the operator is focused, and to replace it during 4 seconds with the
message ”Battery failure, robot returning to base”.
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Fig. 4. Resource graph corresponding to the conflict solving
Table 3 summarizes the second experiment results. The first column in-
dicates the subject id, the second one the conflict duration after sending the
counter-measure and the third one details if all three alarms (needed for conflict
understanding) have been looked at least once since counter-measure sending.
For example, participant Pouch immediately perceived and understood the con-
flict after counter-measure sending; and the counter-measure led him to look at
least once at the three alarms. Participant Garu perceived all the relevant infor-
mation but it took him 26 seconds to release complete control to the robot. The
result analysis shows that this concept of interaction with the human operator,
triggered by the authority dynamics controller, is efficient: 10 participants out
of 12 gave immediately the control back to the robot to let it return to base
automatically. The two other participants, who did not give back the control
immediately, said that they had perceived the conflict thanks to the counter-
measure but wanted to remain close to the targets as they thought they had
enough time before the battery would be totally discharged.
6 Conclusion
In the context of a mission operated jointly by an artificial agent and a human
agent, we have presented an authority dynamics controller, based on a depen-
dency graph between resources that can be controlled by the two agents. It is
aimed at adapting the artificial agent or the human agent’s behaviour in case of
authority conflict on these resources. We have defined the relative authority be-
tween two agents relatively to a given resource through the properties of access,
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preemption, and control guarantee. The authority of an agent over a resource
can thus change during the mission, in order to adjust its behaviour to the other
agent’s behaviour.
Subjet conflict duration (in s.) Seen alarms
Pouch 0 supervised, return to base, battery
Gargu 26 supervised, return to base, battery
Lesc 0 supervised, return to base, battery
Berdo 0 supervised, return to base, battery
Thola 0 supervised, return to base, battery
Lasni 0 supervised, return to base, battery
Gabje 0 supervised, return to base, battery
Jacra 0 supervised, return to base, battery
Magma 0 supervised, return to base, battery
Rogma 50 supervised, return to base, battery
Treau 0 supervised, return to base, battery
Herma 0 supervised, return to base, battery
Table 3. Results with counter-measure sent by the authority dynamics controller
Future experiments should allow us to study more precisely the criteria to
justify an autority loss or gain for an agent over one or several resources, which we
call meta-authority. The experimental aspect will be crucial because allowing
an artificial agent to take over resources controlled by a human agent brings
a lot of new challenges: agents’cohesion, communication and support of the
human operator’situation awareness, operator’s acceptance. Solutions allowing
to influence the operator’s actions without disturbing her (e.g. ”subliminal”
guidance, actions on the operator’s situation awareness using counter-measures,
etc.) must be developed.
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